Network Size, Value and Cycles by Hans W. Gottinger
 
  & &( (1 17 75 52 2 6 67 78 8’ ’, , , ,1 1 ( (& &2 21 12 20 0, ,$ $ ( ( ) ), ,1 1$ $1 1= =$ $
& &( (1 17 75 5( ( ) )2 25 5 6 67 78 8’ ’, ,( (6 6 , ,1 1 ( (& &2 21 12 20 0, ,& &6 6 $ $1 1’ ’ ) ), ,1 1$ $1 1& &( ( 
 
 
: :2 25 5. ., ,1 1* * 3 3$ $3 3( (5 5 1 12 2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 
 
Network Size, Value and Cycles 
 
  










DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE - UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SALERNO  
Via Ponte Don Melillo - 84084 FISCIANO (SA)  
Tel. 089-96 3167/3168 - Fax 089-96 3169 – e-mail: csef@unisa.it  





Network Size, Value and Cycles 
 
  
Hans W. Gottinger 
 








   5 




2. Hypotheses on Network Externalities 
3. Hypotheses on Network Externalities 
4. Technology Adoption, Network Industries and  Network Effects 
5. Networked Industrial Organization 
6. Regression Specification 
7. Regression Results  
8. Effects of Technological Change  







One of the most striking economic aspects of networks is how they create externalities. 
Network externalities occur in both the demand and supply of the network. The textbook 
externality is a supply externality. For example, as a negative byproduct of a factory's 
production, pollution spews into the air or water. Demand externalities, on the other hand, 
may exist for non-network goods, but they are not usually considered important enough to 
merit attention. For example, economists typically do not factor demand externalities into 
consumers' demand functions. Many models of consumer behaviour assume that the average 
consumer's demand for potatoes, lettuce, corn, etc., for example, are formed without any 
reference to how many other people are purchasing these products. Certainly the number of 
consumers in a given market affects demand and therefore price, but an individual's demand 
is independent -- it does not depend directly on a product's popularity in most models. Such 
effects are assumed away as insignificant. 
Besides the supply-side economies of scale the demand-side economies of scale  are 
commonly seen in the communications and computer industries among others. For some 
goods and services, a person's demand depends on the demands of other people, or the 
number of other people who have purchased the same good may affect a person's demand. For 
example, the buyer of a telephone or fax machine would have not bought it if there were no 
one else who had purchased or would have purchased it. When more people have purchased it 
the more value of a telephone or fax machine the buyer would have obtained. This is a 
positive network externality based on an 'actual' or 'physical' network. Moreover, for some 
goods, such as Microsoft Office, the individual demand  for that good inherently exists but 
enormously increases when other people buy the same good.  In an actual network, products 
have very little or no value when alone, they generate value or more value  when combined 
with others (example: fax machine). In a virtual network,  hardware/software network 
products have value even if they exist alone, however, they are more valuable when there are 
more complementary goods, and also there will be more complementary goods when more 
people use the products. Application software developers are likely to write for the platform 
of the operating system that most people favour. Conversely, the operating system that more 
application software writes on are favoured by more people.  The operating system with a 
larger market share will provide a bigger market for the application programs. At the same 
time, the availability of a broader array of application programs will reinforce the popularity 
of an operating system which in turn will make investment in application programs 
compatible with that operating system more desirable than investment in application programs 
compatible with other less popular systems. As a result, the operating system with a larger 
installed base attracts more buyers whereas the small and later entrant with a smaller installed 
base with equal or even superior quality finds it difficult to compete. As more users are 
attracted to a network, the size of the network grows and confers greater value to the network 
users. Network effects directly challenge an important principle of classical economic theory, 
which posits decreasing (and eventually negative) returns  to scale in most markets. Also this 
theory basically deals with increasing returns problems in case of supply side economies of 
scale but ignores cases of demand side economies of scale brought about by increasing value 
of existing users through increased demand, i.e. through network externalities. That is, 
network markets offer increasing returns over a large portion of the demand curve or even the 
entire demand curve. Markets with increasing returns imply that bigger is better and  8 
consumers deriving more value as the number of users grows. The flip side of this situation in 
terms of market structure is that the strong grow stronger and the weak become weaker.  
Hence, network markets provide potentially fruitful returns to firms that can make their 
own products as standards in  markets or in aftermarkets for complementary goods. This 
presents the possibility of substantial first-mover advantages: being the first seller in a market 
may confer an important strategic advantage over later entrants because a first mover's 
technology may become locked in as a standard (Arthur, 1989, Katz and Shapiro, 1986)That 
is to say, the first technology that is introduced into the market may gain excess momentum 
when many early users join in anticipation of other users hopping on the bandwagon at a later 
date. This strong expectation is critical to network expansion (Choi, 1997). In the end 
consumers already belonging to an existing network will not likely switch to a new 
technology, even if it is better (Economides, 1996)  
The switching costs associated with transferring to an incompatible but superior 
technology create 'excess inertia' to consumers. That means consumers will not adopt a new 
superior technology not only because of the sunk costs they have already put in but also 
because  values from network externalities may be lost if they switch. Network effects, 
therefore, could stifle innovation. 
In a traditional market, where network effects are negligible or non-existent, competition 
turns primarily upon price, quality and service considerations. In contrast, in those markets in 
which network effects are significant, competition plays out in other dimensions as well: 
particularly in strategies to establish, maintain, and control standards for the industry. The 
computer industry hence suggests that network effects have played an important role in 
shaping the market structure and the margins on which competition occurs. 
Also, increasing returns raise the possibility of leveraging a monopoly power from one 
market to another. Because users may be reluctant to commit to any given system unless they 
believe it will be adopted by many others, the 'network owner' may engage in a variety of 
strategies to discourage potential buyers from buying a smaller network regardless whether or 
not it is superior. Strategies include expanding the system to include complementary products  
offering a wide variety of complementary products at very attractive prices or through 
bundling. At the same time, leveraging is able to raise rivals' economic costs of competing in 
the marketplace. 
For example, in its effort to be adopted as the next generation standard, the owner of one 
element of a system may enter complementary markets by engaging in alliances as part of a 
strategy of attracting users to its network. Consequently, rival operating systems need to 
ensure the provision of substantial complementary products in the market, otherwise very few 
buyers will try its system. As a result, the follow-on improved  or complementary products 
markets become very difficult.  
Strong network effects are therefore themselves barriers to entry, even though it is 
sometimes unclear whether entry into the market ought to be encouraged. Since the increasing 
return deters the incentive of new entrants and increases the costs of new entrants. Such a 
blunting of incentives can occur if the leveraging practice is undertaken, not primarily as part 
of a vigorous competitive strategy, but in part to decrease the likelihood of competitor entry, 
so that the dominant firm will continue to be dominant in competition for the next market. 
This has clearly be shown for the Japanese telecommunications market (Gottinger and 
Takashima, 2000b) The unlikelihood of success for new entrants will reduce the incentives of  9 
other competitors to innovate to  the extent that these competitors perceive that the 
opportunities to profit from their innovations are hindered. All of this is particularly 
significant because markets in which there is rapid technological progress are often markets in 
which switching costs are high, in which users find it costly to switch to a new technology 
that is not fully compatible with the older technology. The result is an increase in entry 
barriers. 
From what follows the definition of a network externality is given by the value of a 
network created by the number of its nodes. Also, network externalities can exist both for the 
supply and demand side of the economic equation. And networks can generate negative, 
positive or no externalities. Network externality networks are those that decrease in value 
when the number of nodes increases. More 'traditional' network industries fit into this 
category. 
 
2.  Perspectives on Network Externalities 
We start with a useful distinction suggested by Economides (1996) in his survey of the 
literature, he divides the work on network externalities into what he calls macro and micro 
approaches. Macro investigations assume that externalities exist and then attempt to model 
their consequences. Micro investigations start with market and industry structures in an 
attempt to derive (theoretically) the source of network externalities. The later category is 
largely founded on case studies.  Three of those are symptomatic. David's(1985) QWERTY 
study, 
Arthur's (1989) model, and the domination of VHS in the videotape recorder market 
combined, spurred  theoretical and empirical interest in network externalities. The gist of 
David's QWERTY study is that inferior technologies through network externalities may be 
subject to 'lock-ins'.  This might apply to the keyboard QWERTY  as well as to the adoption 
of the VHS  against the Betamax standard though with specific technological advantages of 
Betamax over VHS. In empirical support of network externalities, Gandel (1994) finds that 
consumers pay a premium for spreadsheets which are compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 (an 
industry standard for spreadsheets). In other words, consumers are willing to pay for the 
ability to share spreadsheet information and analysis easily with other computer users. Thus 
he concludes that there is strong empirical support for the existence of network externalities in 
the computer spreadsheet market. In another aper, Saloner and Shepard (1990) test for the 
existence of network externalities in the network of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), 
their results support existence. 
 
3.  Hypotheses on Network Externalities 
Perhaps it is not surprising that little quantitative work on network externalities has been 
done. Many examples of network industries embody cutting-edge technologies, given that 
theoretical work on network externalities is still relatively new, data collection is fragmentary 
and common data sets upon which to test theories are severely limited. One particular  10 
important question emerging on network externalities is the functional relationship between 
the size of a network (its   number of nodes) and the network's value. 
Three key assumptions about the relationship between network size and network value 
underlie most analyses of network externalities  and their effects. They relate to linear, 
logarithmic and exponential assumptions. 
The linear assumption postulates that, as networks grow, the marginal value of new nodes 
is constant. The logarithmic assumption postulates that, as a network grows, the marginal 
value of new nodes diminishes. Network externalities at the limit in this formulation must be 
either negative, zero or of inconsequential magnitude in comparison to quantity effects on 
prices. In contrast, Katz and Shapiro (1985) make their assumptions explicit: network 
externalities are positive but diminish with development, at the limit they are zero.In any case, 
network effects diminish in importance in these models as a network grows. The third key 
assumption about the relationship between network size and value is the exponential 
assumption which  in the popular business and technology press has been named 'Metcalfe's 
Law'. It embodies the idea of positive network externalities whose marginal value increases 
with network size. Robert Metcalfe (1995) states the 'law' in this way: "In a network of N 
users, each sees a value proportional to the N-1 others, so the total value of the network grows 
as N(N-1), or as N squared for large N". The validity of Metcalfe's Law is crucial to the 
'increasing returns' debate on the New Economy, facilitated by the aggregation of positive 
network externalities in high tech industries. One could also consider a mixture of hypotheses 
such as a combination of Metcalfe's Law and the logarithmic assumption, that is early 
additions to the network add exponentially to the value of a network, yet later additions 
diminish in their marginal value. The result looks like an S curve, as illustrated.(Figures 1 and 
2)  It is based on the idea that early additions to a network are extremely valuable, but at some 




Figure 1 : Three Assumption of the Network Size/ Value 
Relationship  11 
 
 
In summary, the industry and hence aggregate (growth) benefits can be classified as follows: 
(i)  industries that show an exponential growth (through strong complementarity) 
(ii)  industries that show linear growth (additive benefits) 
(iii) industries that show a log relationship (stable benefits) 
The mixtures of those economies create the features of the new economy.  Such an economy 
is not immune to economic cycles, but to the extent that the network economy snowballs in an 
upswing period, by the same token it might also along the supply chain contract faster in a 
downswing period but with a better chance to stabilize quicker. 
 
4.  Technology Adoption, Network Industries and  Network Effects 
We look at the main hypotheses as how they are likely to affect the adoption process of 
particular network industries. The linear hypothesis is the assumption of Arthur's (1989)   
model  subject to simulation. Given a very large number of trials, technology adoption leads  
(almost surely) to lock-ins. Given two technologies, A and B,  further  R  and S agents that 
make adoption decisions, respectively, in Arthur's model  each trial represents a random walk 
of an ever increasing number of R and S agent decisions. As the number of trials increases, 
with symmetries in both technologies A and B, the split between A and B adoptions approach 
fifty-fifty. That is, either one of them will be adopted, and non-adoption will be most unlikely. 
Figure 2 : The S-Hypothesis 12 
In Arthur's analytical model, as the number of iteration goes to infinity, the possibility of non-
adoption disappears.  
Correspondingly, the average adoption time until lock-in will increase with decreasing 
probability (of non- adoption), in conformity with the linear hypothesis, in other words, more 
agents  become (linearly) more convinced  to adopt either way. This suggests that the network 
effect leaves only a neutral impact on the innovation process. Against this bench mark, when 
the value of network size grows logarithmically in relation to its size, the average time until 
lock-in occurs is extended.  What appears surprising is how much the logarithmic assumption 
delays lock-in. That is, the logarithmic specification creates less growth prospects and greater 
instability  by delaying (or preventing) adoption from occurring. In contrast to the logarithmic 
hypothesis, the exponential assumption  shortens the average time until adoption occurs. The 
average adoption is affected just as drastically by the exponential assumption as by the 
logarithmic one. With the exponential assumption, however, the average adoption occurs 
much earlier than in the baseline case. No wonder, that on an aggregate scale across network 
industries, it is this network effect that lends support to ‘increasing returns’ by the proponents 
of the New Economy. It can even be reinforced by speed of transactions, for example,   
enabled through large scale broadband internet technologies. This would support a scenario of  
a sustained realization of an exponential assumption as even more likely.  If it can be 
established that the Internet triggers a technology adoption process in the form of a large and 
broad wave (‘tsunami’) across key industries, sectors, regions and countries , then increasing 
returns will generate exceptional growth rates for many years to come. For this to happen 
there should be a critical mass of network industries being established in an economy. Then 
an innovation driven network economy feeds on itself  with endogeneous growth. It remains 
to be determined, empirically, which mix of sectors, with network effects with exponential, 
linear and logarithmic relationships will have a sustained endogeneous growth cycle. 
From a slightly different perspective, it is interesting to note that the logarithmic 
assumption creates instability in the models. Metcalfe's law, on the other hand, which leads to 
immediate adoption, creating a dynamics of its own, would prevent many contemporary 
models from reaching equilibrium. 
 
5.   Networked Industrial Organization 
The development of the Internet  and its use for business transactions, B 2 B or B 2 C., 
would make a good subject for the analysis of  business cycles for several reasons. First, the 
Internet might constitute a formal mapping of business transactions for a networked economy, 
or major parts of their industries. Second, the Internet itself can be modelled and designed as a 
set  of transactions among various agents, consumers, network suppliers and services, that 
reflect the size and complexity of a distributed computing system (Gottinger, 2000a). That is, 
the Internet provides prototypical examples of a positive network externality industry.   
Unfortunatly, the Internet is 'too recent' to make it  an eligible candidate for a statistical study 
on the value of a network. Instead we use the US telecommunications network over the past 
50 years. There are some intuitive reasons. In many industry studies, where positive network 
externalities are defined, Economides (1996)  and the Economist (1995), telecommunications 
is named as the signature network industry. The telecommunications industry is somehow 
described as a 'typical' network industry that makes it a logical place to begin a search for 
empirical evidence. Due to its structural similarity with other network industries like  13 
railroads, airlines, and the Internet, conclusions reached about network externalities in the 
communications system are arguably applicable to all of the rest.  
In correspondence to the classification (i) to (iii) in Sect. 2 we would venture the 
hypothesis that (i) exponential growth would likely be associated with  an emerging, broadly 
based  advanced technological, strongly growing network industry, (ii) a  linear relationship  
would be tantamount to a maturing, structurally stable  industry, while  (iii) a logarithmic 
shape would go with a technologically mature, well established industry. 
The  weighting of factors  (i) to (iii)  would characterize the scope and degree of a new 
economy, the higher the share of  (i)  and possibly (ii)  the stronger the scope of a New 
Economy though  a sizable share of (i) to (iii)  would form the basis of a New Economy.  
We conjecture that  the higher (i) and (ii) in a sizable share of  (i) to (iii)  the stronger the 
cyclicity of the economy  and the higher the  volatility  of movements.. 
 
6.   Regression Specification 
Regression analysis can test the three hypotheses about the relationship between network 
size and network value. Determining  "network value" is an obvious difficulty for empirical 
research done on network externalities. Gandal (1994) addresses the issue of network value 
by analysing prices: evidence of a price premium for products with a large network indicates 
that consumers value network externalities positively. The price approach, however, would be 
flawed if applied to the US telephone network due to its heavy regulation from the 1920s 
through the 1982 divestiture of AT&T. An alternative approach in such a regulated 
environment   is to observe netwok usage as a proxy for network value, with greater network 
usage indicating greater network value. 
Based upon conventional economic theory and ideas about network externalities, there are 
six variables which are likely to determine use of the US telephone network and which should 
therefore be considered in a regression analysis: 
1)  network size (number of nodes),  
2)  price of using the network;  
3)  the price of substitute services;  
4) the  population  ; 
5) income;  and   
6)    investment in the telephone network. Each of these variables can bequantified either 
through data that US telephone companies report or through standard statistical measures 
of the US population and economy: network size is recorded in the number of telephones 
active in a given year; average prices for the telephone and its major  historical substitute 
(the telegraph or later the fax)) can be derived from company operating revenues; 
telephone system capital investment is tracked: and population and income are standard 
data kept by the US government. Moreover, network usage can be quanttified as the 
number of telephone conversations per year.  14 
Ad hoc conjecture, based upon standard economic logic, argues for the following predicted 
signs. Average price of a telephone call should be negatively correlated with network use. 
Population, income, capital investment, and average price of telephone substitutes should be 
positively correlated with telephone network use. These predictions are summarized in Table 
1: 
 
TABLE 1 : REGRESSION VARIABLES AND PREDICTED SIGNS 
 
Variable Proxy  Data Expected  Sign 
Network Value 
(dependent) 
Network Usage  Number of phone 
conversations/year 
 
Network size    Number of “telephone sets”  Positive* 
Price of network use    Average cost of phone call  Negative 
Substitute goods’ price    Average cost of telegram  Positive 
Income   Real  GDP  Positive 
Telephone system 
investment 
 Capital  investment/year  Positive 
Regulatory change  Dummy     
*  See text for more detail on the expected sign of the network size variable 
 
The sign of the relationship between network usage, of course, is the primary  focus. Two 
methods for specifying and testing the hypotheses regarding network size and usage could be 
used. The first method specifies a separate model for each hypothesis and then compares the 
fit of each model to the data. The second method uses a model general enough that any of the 
three hypotheses could be valid, and then uses the estimated beta coefficients to determine the 
most likely specification. We use the latter method because the model specifications 
necessary for the first method would be difficult to compare on the basis of fit (specifically, 
using a logarithmic transformation makes comparison to untransformed data problematic).  
The second more general method requires that the variable's specification must be flexible 
enough to produce any of the functional forms of the hypotheses. Thus we use a polynomial 
equation to evaluate the relationship between network size and usage. Given a polynomial of 
sufficient degree, any functional form can be reproduced. Equation  (1) shows the general 
form of the regression model, where y is the dependent variable and  the b's  represent the 
beta coefficients. 
  y  = a + b￿ size + b2 size
2 + b3  size
3 + b4 Pphone + b5 Ptel + b6 GDP + b7 Dummy + … (1)
  15 
Population does not appear as a separate variable in this formulation because all non-price 
variables have been transformed to per capita measures. 
Estimation of the beta coefficients in equation (1) should yield evidence as to which of the 
hypotheses most accurately represents the ralationship and value in the telephone network. 
For example, if b1 and significant while b2 and b3   are not sinificantly different from zero, this 
evidence would support the linear hypothesis (ii). In contrast, if b2 were the only positive and 
significant coefficient, this would lend support to the assumptions of  Metcalfe's law. 
The logarithmic and S-shape hypotheses  could be simulated through several combinations 
of positive and negative coefficients among the polynomial  terms, but a mixture of signs 
coupled with significant coefficients for the higher order polynomial terms could argue for 
either the logarithmic or  S-shape hypotheses. In any case, examining the signs of the 
variables will serve as both a check for consistency of the model specification against 
theoretical expectations and as an argument for which hypothesis best fits the data. 
Econometric Issues. One potential problem of working simultaneously with a dependent 
variable like network usage and the independent variables of network size, income, and 
network investment is that these variables are likely to trend upward together. The similar 
growth  patterns of these four variables can then make it awkward to disentangle the effects of 
each independent variable on variation in the dependent variable. Such a situation may also 
tend toward the presence of heteroskedacity and serial correlation. Three measures are taken 
here to guard against the potential problems of working with these time series. First, we add a 
lagged dependent variable to the independent terms to remove significant time trends. Second, 
we perform the regression on both the untransformed dependent variable and ist natural log to 
check for significant potential problems with residuals. And third, we use the Durbin-Watson 
and Cook-Weisberg tests to check for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
 
7.  Regression Results 
The reggression results  overall  support the linear  assumption of (ii) although there is 
some evidence that the exponential assumption of (i) is valid  for a group of new network 
industries. 
During the course of the analysis, we tested several versions of the regression model. 
These versions varied primarily in the number of network size polynomial terms (Model with 
up to the fifth order polynomials were tested), the inclusion  of a lagged dependent variable, 
and in the inclusion of interaction terms. The need to correct for a strong time trend and the 
existence of serial correlation and /or heteroskedacity in early model specifications led to the 
inclusion of a lagged depenedent variable and the use of the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Also 
the investment variable was  dropped from the model because of multicollinearity problems as 
it correlated nearly perfectly with the variable measuring network size. 
Table 2 presents the full regression equation with estimated coefficients, standard errors of 
the coefficients, and t-statistics.   
  16 
The full regression shows mixed results with two outstanding points. First, the linear, 
squared, and cubic terms of network size are significant at the respective confidence levels of 
one, five, and ten percent. 
 
TABLE  2: FULL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Predictor Variable  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-statistic 
Doonvlag Lagged  Dependent  0893283  0986104  0.906 
Netsize (NS)  Number of telephone Sets  1550.075  251.3466  6.167*** 
NS2   NetSize squared  -1291.108  678.0486  -1.904** 
NS3 Netsize  cubed  1471.154  727.8555  2.021* 
Tgrafh  Average real price of 
telegram 
10.35254 9.395631  1.102 
GNPpc  Per capita real GNP  -0037915  0062658  -0.605 
Avgcallp  Average real price of 
telephone call 
-91.92725 149.9191  -0.613 
 
Monop  Structural change dummy  -2.168961  6.681732  -0.325 
 
Inter Constant  3.082576  22.13733  0.139 
Rho Cochrane-Orcutt  correction  0.8036  0.0732  10.973*** 
   No.  of  obs.=67    
   R-sq=98.7%  AdjR-sq=98.6%   
 
***  Denotes variable significant at the 1% level 
 **   Denotes variable significant at the 5% level 
   *   Denotes variable significant at the 10% level 
 
This indicates some nonlinearity in the relationship between network size and value. 
Second, the other explanatory variables in this specification covering income and substitution 
effects are not significant.  
These regression results are not especially convincing, given the lack of significance for all 
price variables, but this regression serves as a useful stepping stone  in the econometric 
analysis. The important piece of information to glean from this full regression is the estimated 
relationship between network size and value derived from the network size coefficients and 
the data. Forecasting a doubling in the density of telephones per capita in the US using the 
estimated coefficients displays an upward trend of a weak exponential relationship. Because 
the upward trend appears only in forecast, though, the evidence for the exponential hypothesis 
should be considered  weak on average.. Because the three network size terms essentially 
estimate a linear relationship between the number of telephones per capita and the number of 
domestic conversations per capita per year, a logical modification to the full regression 
specification given above is to eliminate the network size squared and cubic terms. 
Respecifying the regression in this manner results in an increase in the t-statistics for both the  17 
price variables, though the telephone call price variable can still not be assumed to be non-
zero. The full results of this final regression appear in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: FINAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Predictor Variable  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-statistic 
DconvLag  Lagged Dependent  - 0969381  -0983045  0.986 
Netsize (NS)  Number of telefhone sets  1216.536  140.8213  8.639*** 




CNPpc  Per capita real GNP  -0036921  0063857  -0.578 
Avgcallp  Avarage real price of 
telephone call 
-151.5678 140.7213  -1.077 
Monop Structural  Dummy  -1.440889  6.617304  -0.218 
Constant   18.70185 12.24442  1.527 
Rho Cochrane-orcutt 
procedural variable 
0.8442 0.0626  13.492*** 
    No. Of obs.=67     
   R-sq=98.1%  AdjRsq=97.9%   
 
***  Denotes variable significant at the 1% level 
 **   Denotes variable significant at the 5% level 
  *    Denotes variable significant at the 10% level 
 
Two clear concerns in a model with significant time trends and a high adjusted R-squared 
measurement are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Neither of the model specifications, 
however, displays signs of these problems. Fitted values versus residuals plots show no 
apparent problems with the residuals. Moreover, the Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity cannot reject the null hypothesis of costant variance and the Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure for correcting autocorrelation has been employed. The subsequent Durbin – 
Watson h-statistic indicates no autocorrelation at a one percent level of significance for each 
of the specifications.  
 
8.  Effects of Technological Change 
In the present case, one difficulty to observe variables that may affect the relationship 
between network size and network value and thus create problems in the results is 
technoloical change. Technological improvements, through better quality, value added 
features, high speed access and the like, could cause an upward shift in the relationship 
between network size and value. In other words, given a certain network size, technological 
improvements alone could lead to greater network usage. Fig. 3 shows the potential problems  18 
that shifts in the true relationship can cause for estimations. The straight lines t1, t2 , t3  show 
the true relationship as it shifts up; the curved line illustrates how sampling at different times 
can estimate an upward -curving relationship when it is really linear.  
 
9.    Conclusions 
For various key technological sectors or industries we can identify  a strong network 
economy with an exponential network value to size relation, as compared to one with a linear 
or logarithmic relationship.  Such an economy  is characterized by rapid growth and 
innovation trajectories reinforced by expectations on queueing constraints. As the dynamics 
unfolds, lack of coordination through competriutive pressures  creates excess capacities which 
with a slackening demand supported by diminiished expectations leads to swift, drastic and 
steep decline avalanching through  the supply chain network. An exponential type network 
economy would trigger significantly more volatile business cycles than we would see in any 
network economies, or even in the rest  of the  old economy. The level or extent to which a 
strong network economy affects the overall economy, such as the US economy recently, even 
less so physically than in perception, is tantamount to a serial negative queuing effect which is 
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Data for regressions performed come partly from Historical Statistics of the United States 
(HSUS), from l950 to 1970, for the remaining period up to 2000 annual FCC reports have 
been used. The time series have been constructed from various data sets over long periods of 
time, the notes on these data are extensive. 
 
i.  Elimination of duplicate figures. In HSUS two separate figures exist for a number of 
years (see for example, data on the number of telephone instruments, the number of calls 
made, plant, revenue, and cost information). Usually, one figure is derived from FCC 
reports, and the other is culled from census data. These data do not always match. The 
yearly time series data were maintained, and the census material eliminated from the data 
set. 
ii.  Creation of the dependent variable. Time series in HSUS give the average daily number 
of telephone calls in the U.S. from 1950 to 1970. To eliminate international data that exist 
in these time series but should not appear in the dependent variable time series, the new 
figures were obtained by subtracting overseas phone calls from total conversations per 
year. 
iii.  Per capita transformation. The dependent variable (domestic conversations), the lagged 
dependent variable, and the independent variables network size, network size squared, 
network size cubed, and gross national product were transformed to per capita 
measurements using census figures. 
iv.  Creation of Price Variables. To create a figure for the average cost of telephone 
conversation, total telephone industry operating revenue was divided by the total number 
of conversations. Similarly, the average price of a telegram were calculated through the 
operating revenues of the entire domestic telegraph industry from 1950 to 1980. These 
operating revenues were divided by the total number of telegrams handled to arrive at the 
average figure. All price data and the time series for GNP were converted to real figures 
using historical consumer price index information. The base year is 1967. 
v.  Full Regression Specification 
 
We  present the full regression results for the three regression specifications discussed in 
the text. 
 
*  For the regression calculations I am indebted to Jan van Straaten, Univ. of Maastricht.  21 
Full Regression Specification 
(Cochrane-Orcutt regression) 
 Iteration  0:  rho  =  0.0000 
 Iteration  l:  rho  =  0.3183 
 Iteration  2:  rho  =  0.5303 
 Iteration  3:  rho  =  0.6652 
 Iteration  4:  rho  =  0.7374 
 Iteration  5:  rho  =  0.7748 
 Iteration  6: rho  =  0.7922 
 Iteration  7:  rho  =  0.7994 
 
 Iteration  8:  rho  =  0.8022 





source          Number of obs       50 
  SS  df  MS    F (8,      58)  =  563.52 
Model  156259.631  8  19532.4538    prob > -F  =  0.0000 
Residual 2010.38066  58 34.6617355    R-squared  =  0.9873 
         Adj  R-squared  =  0.9855 





        
DomConv  Coef.  Std. Err.  t    [ 95% Conf.interval ] 
DconvLag -0893283 .0986104  0.906      -.1080619 .2867185 
NS 1550.075 251.3466  6.167  0.000  1046.95  2053.2 
NS2 -1291.108  678.0486  -1.904  0.062 -2648.369  66.15401 
NS3 1471.154 727.8555  2.021  0.048 14.19284 2928.115 
Tgraph 10.35254 9.395631  1.102  0.275 -8.45486 29.15994 
GNPpc -.0037915  .0062658  -0.605 0.547  -.0163339  .0087509 
AvgceLUp  -91.92725 149.9191  -0.613  0.542 -392.023 208,1685 
Mmop  -2.168961 6.681732  -0.325  0.747 -15.5439 11.20598 
-inter 3.082576 22.13733  0.139  0.890 -41.2301 47.39525 
rho 0.8036 0.0732 10.973  0.000 0.6573 0.9498 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.360806 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed)    1.923850 
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Final Regression Specification 
 (Cochrane-Orcutt regression) 
 Iteration  0:  rho  =  0.0000 
 Iteration  l:  rho  =  0.4283 
 Iteration  2:  rho  =  0.5829 
 Iteration  3:  rho  =  0.6910 
 Iteration  4:  rho  =  0.7650 
 Iteration  5:  rho  =  0.8077 
 Iteration  6: rho  =  0.8288 
 Iteration  7:  rho  =  0.8381 
 
 Iteration  8:  rho  =  0.8420 




source          Number of obs       50 
  SS  df  MS    F (6,      60)  =  504.79 
Model  108242.777  6  18040.4629    prob > -F  =  0.0000 
Residual 214444.31715  60  35.7386192   R-squared  =  0.9806 
         Adj  R-squared  =  0.9786 





         
DomConv  Coef.  Std. Err.  t    [ 95% Conf.interval ] 
DconvLag  .0969381  .0983045  0.986   0000  -.0997001     .2935763 
NS 1216.536 140.8213  8.639  0.000  934.8516  1498.221 
 -    -  0.062  -   
      0.048     
Tgraph 16.05634 5.843993  2.747  0.275  4.366612  27.74606 
GNPpc -.0036921  .0063857 -0.5785 0.547  -.0164654  .0090813 
Avgcallp -151.5678  140.7313  -1.077  0.542  -433.0523  129.9168 
Monop  -1.440889  6.617304  -0.218  0.747           -14.6774  11.79569 
-inter 0.132  -5.790629  43.19433  0.890    
rho 0.8442 0.0626  13.492  0.000  0.7193  0.9691 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.142124 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed)    2.002030 
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Durbin-Watson Statistics 
 
The  transformed Durbin-Watson statistics for the two regression specifications are:  
 
(full) 1.923850, and  (final) 2.002030. Because a lagged dependent variable is used in the regressions, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic cannot be used to judge the presence of autocorrelation (Studenmund, 1992), rather, the 
D-WQ statistic must be transformed into Durbin’s h-statistic. Durbin’s h-statistic for the two specifications are, 
respectively, 0.38611546 and –0.0103251, these statistics do not allow a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 











Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedacity using fitted values of DomConv 
 
              Ho:  Constant Variance 
              chi2(1)  = 0.35 





Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using fitted values of DomConv 
 
                 Ho: Constant Variance 
                 chi2(1)   = 0.53 
                 Prob > chi2  = 0.4655 
 
 
 
 